Internationally considerable policy attention is being paid to increasing the employment participation of disabled working age people. Like other OECD countries, Australia has experienced growth in the number of Disability Support Pension (DSP) recipients due to changes in industry structure and increases in precarious employment.
Introduction
In Australia the primary social security payment for disabled working age persons is Disability Support Pension (DSP) 1 . DSP receipt is traditionally associated with low labour force participation levels. It is a non-activity-tested payment, so a disabled person is not obligated to engage in job-seeking activities to receive DSP. In 2002 approximately 88% of DSP recipients were economically inactive 2 and only one-tenth of DSP recipients were employed. In contrast, in the same year only one-fifth of working age persons not receiving DSP were economically inactive. Those not in receipt of DSP were seven times as likely to be employed as DSP recipients 3 .
In recent years disability policy in OECD countries has moved away from guaranteeing income security and emphasizing the importance of economic participation. Australia, along with countries like United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, have reduced disability cash benefit levels while increasing efforts to assist disabled people to gain employment (Mont 2004) . In Australia the focus on DSP recipients is also being considered more broadly in the context of growth in the number of 'economically inactive' adults, particularly men (Lattimore 2007 Following the budget announcement there has been considerable public debate about the likely outcomes of this proposed change. The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), the main peak organisation for non-government welfare service providers, argues that the chief effect will be to divert approximately 80% of new DSP applicants from the higher DSP payment to the lower NSA payment. It estimates that these applicants, if they remain on NSA, because they cannot find employment, will receive There is a prima facie case that the housing circumstances of DSP recipients do matter because of the connection between disability, poverty and housing stress. Saunders (2005) finds that 'having a household member with a disability is associated with a substantial increase in the incidence of financial hardship, a higher probability of experiencing severe financial stress'. program changes aimed at increasing employment participation of DSP applicants diverted onto NSA?' The paper responds to these questions in six parts. First, the paper describes the growth in DSP recipients and reviews the research analysing this growth. It is important that the broader trends and underlying causes are recognised before considering the DSP-housing relationship. Second, the paper presents an analysis of the housing circumstances of DSP recipients by describing the distribution of DSP recipients in the homeownership, private rental and public rental tenures. This highlights the increasing incidence of DSP receipt in the private rental and public rental tenures. Third, the institutional context is described by outlining the tax-benefit and housing assistance programs in Australia. This is followed by an account of the DSP and NSA regimes and the methodology that has been used to simulate outcomes for the NSA regime that can be compared with the DSP regime. Fourth, the impact on housing affordability under the NSA regime is presented. Fifth, the impact on work disincentives for each of the tenure groups is presented. Finally, the paper illustrates the impact of the changes on real-life cases by presenting simulation results for two case studies.
Growth in DSP
The number of DSP recipients has been growing steadily for more than three decades as indicated in Figure 1 . During this period there have been three distinct stages, 1972-1980, 1983-1991 and 1992-2004 (1988) analysis by arguing that the rate of increase began in the 1970s as older males faced a weakening labour market due to a loss in 'traditional' male full-time jobs, especially in manufacturing. They argue that causality stems primarily from labour market change and introduce the term 'labour market disabled '. Cai & Gregory (2004) similarly find that 'worsening labour market conditions, represented by an increase in the unemployment rate, led to an increase in the number of DSP recipients'. At the same time disability policy and practices are framed within the income security system and used to define the criteria for assessing applicants and how these criteria should be applied (Galvin 2003; 2004; Cai & Gregory 2002; 2004 However, this has more to do with changes to the income security system than change in the labour market or rate of disability amongst women (Chalmers & Siminski 2003) .
Third, the three largest groups of DSP recipients are those with a musculoskeletal/connective tissue condition (34%), a psychological/ psychiatric illness . This often involves change in housing tenure, including leaving public housing, changing from owner to renter and paying increased rent (ibid).
DSP recipients and their housing
The housing circumstances of DSP recipients can be understood initially by examining Public renters rent from a SHA. Those living rent-free neither own nor rent and are excluded from the analysis. Several noteworthy trends can be observed from Figure 2 about how the growing number of DSP recipients has intersected with housing tenure arrangements in the last two decades.
Figure 2 here
As shown in Figure 2 , between 1982 and 2002 the percentage of DSP recipients slightly more than doubled among outright owners, owner purchasers and private renters. This increase was from 3% to 7% among outright owners, 0.7% to 1.8% among owner purchasers and 2% to 4.5% among private renters. Notably, the DSP rate more than tripled among public renters from 8% to 27%. The differences between the DSP and NSA regimes are illustrated in Figure 3 . Firstly, DSP is a pension, while NSA is an allowance. Pensions are benefits paid to people expected to be indefinitely out of the labour force, such as the aged and disabled.
Allowances are benefits paid to unwaged people seeking work or who are expected to return to work in the short-term (including persons with short-term sicknesses). Pensions are more generous than allowances. The current weekly maximum DSP rate for single (partnered) persons is approximately $40 ($20) higher than NSA (S 1 >S 2 in Figure 3) .
Second, the DSP income-free area (allowable income level before the benefit is reduced) 
Figure 3 here
Because the DSP and NSA regimes interact with the tax and housing assistance systems, the impacts of a shift from DSP to NSA cannot be obtained from an analysis of the benefits alone. First, DSP is non-taxable while NSA is taxable. Hence, DSP recipients diverted onto NSA will face a decrease in disposable income if they do not gain employment. Second, public renters pay income-related rents, set at the lower of 25% of income or market rent. They receive housing assistance in the form of a housing subsidy equivalent to market rent minus income-related rent. When diverted onto NSA, public renters' income and therefore rent will fall, resulting in an increase in subsidy. Because of these interactions, a microsimulaton methodology is employed to assess the The AHURI tax-benefit model is operationalised using SIHC microdata, which contains cases that reflect the heterogeneity of the Australian population and is a rich source of income and housing data. While the Welfare to Work reforms were fully implemented in 
Impacts on housing affordability
In Australia income units are in housing stress if they are in the bottom 40% of the gross income distribution and pay more than 30% of gross income on housing (National We employ three measures to quantify the differential impacts of the policy simulation across housing tenures. First, we compare before-and after-housing income. Second, we calculate a housing affordability ratio, which expresses housing costs as a percentage of income unit income. Third, we measure the percentage of income units in housing stress under the alternative regimes. Housing costs for outright owners are general and water rates; for purchasers rates and mortgage repayments; for private renters rent less CRA;
and for public renters income-related rents. Any housing assistance received is treated as an offset against housing costs, not as part of income. Hence, our affordability ratio is a net affordability ratio (NAR). In this section, income is equivalised using OECD equivalence scales that allocate 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for each additional adult and 0.5 for each child. The simulation results are reported in Table 1 . Table 1 here Table 1 shows that for owners, housing costs do not change following the policy change.
For private renters, housing costs increase slightly. This is because a small percentage of private renters who receive DSP would not be eligible for NSA in the new regime because the NSA cut-out point is lower than the DSP cut-out point. Hence, they will not receive CRA because CRA is paid as a supplement to government benefits. Public renters experience a substantial fall in housing costs because rents are income-related. Both DSP and NSA recipients are eligible for CRA but the level of CRA received is dependent on the market rent level rather than income level. Hence, while private renters will experience a decrease in income, they will not benefit from an increase in CRA as long as rent remains the same. The change from DSP to NSA therefore has potentially significant negative implications for private renters' housing affordability levels.
Owner purchasers have the highest housing costs because of mortgage repayments.
However, as opposed to private renters, purchasers experience little change in the level of housing stress following the policy change despite high housing costs. Purchasers' average after-housing income is almost twice the average of all tenures. This is not surprising as over one-third of DSP purchaser income units are employed, compared to under 15% of the other tenures. In the 2002 HILDA Survey, one-quarter of DSP private renter income units reported inability to pay rent on time, while only 16% of DSP purchaser income units reported that they could not pay their mortgage on time.
Moreover, the extent of purchasers' decline to housing affordability will depend a great deal on the length of time they have been purchasers. Purchasers in the early period of mortgage, especially first home purchasers, typically pay a large proportion of income in repayments. In later years repayments are likely to form a smaller proportion of income.
If the age profile of purchasers who apply for DSP is the same as the current profile of DSP recipients it is likely that most will be in the later years of the mortgage and therefore experience a moderate decline in housing affordability.
Outright owners experience almost no change in housing affordability. Outright owners do not make mortgage repayments and therefore have low housing costs. Low-income outright owners traditionally experience few housing affordability problems.
Public renters typically pay income-related rent set at 25% of income and almost all have such low incomes that mean they do not pay the median market rent. Consequently when public renters are diverted onto NSA their rent will fall and the level of subsidy will increase. This is happening in a housing sector that is very constrained as Australian government funding for public housing has declined by one-quarter in real terms over the period 1990 -2000 (Hall & Berry 2004 . This has been a result of the government's decision to increasingly use CRA to provide housing assistance to low income Australians. The result has been increased rationing of public housing stock and an increasing proportion of public housing eligible persons being forced to rent privately.
Moreover, it is important to note that this change will reduce SHA revenue. Already the combined effect of reducing grant income and declining tenant incomes has resulted in SHAs incurring structural deficits (Hall & Berry 2004) . The introduction of this new regime will further undermine SHA financial viability. SHAs will experience rent revenue loss as existing DSP recipients move out of public housing and are replaced by tenants who apply for DSP but are judged to be able to work at least 15 hours per week 8 .
If we assume that all DSP recipients in public housing in 2002 were moved onto NSA, SHA rent income would be reduced by $33 million.
Impacts on work disincentives
In order to quantify the work incentives facing DSP recipients who are unemployed or economically inactive (unwaged), we measure and compare the replacement ratio (RR)
under the DSP and NSA regimes using the microsimulation model and Wood et al. partner is employed but the other is not, we calculate the RR for the unwaged partner only, holding the waged partner's employed status constant. Where both partners are unwaged, we calculate a RR for the first unwaged partner holding the second's unwaged status constant and then separately calculate a RR for the second partner holding the first' unwaged status constant. This is done because the expected wage of each individual is likely to be different resulting in different RRs for partners within an income unit. As in the case of housing affordability, the income measures in the numerator and denominator of the RR are income unit income. Because partners within an income unit share income, the work incentive of a partnered person will be affected by his/her income unit's income rather than his/her income alone. For example, in the first case where one partner is employed but the other is not, the employed partner's wage will cushion the unwaged partner's economic well-being, hence blunting the unwaged partner's work incentives. Y . Even when an unwaged person gains employment, he/she is still eligible to receive benefits at a reduced rate if income is low. Wage estimates are derived from wage equations that have been estimated from samples of working age male and female employees. The equations control for selection bias using the Heckman correction and are reported in Table 2 . Table 2 here Table 3 presents RR estimates by housing tenure in terms of mean and median RRs together with the percentage of persons with RRs greater than 75%. Table 3 here Table 3 shows that overall RRs are 6-9 percentage points higher under the NSA regime than the DSP regime. In other words the financial disincentive, regardless of tenure, will be greater under the NSA regime. This is mainly due to NSA being less generous than DSP. As Figure 3 shows, NSA provides a lower level of benefit income than DSP. As most unwaged DSP recipients would attract low wages if employed, most would still be entitled to part payments of benefits in an employed state 10 . NSA has a lower income-free threshold and higher withdrawal rates than DSP. Hence, when an unwaged DSP recipient moves into employment, he/she loses a higher level of government benefit payment under the NSA regime than the DSP regime. The mean benefit level received by unwaged DSP recipients under the DSP regime is $10,619 and approximately 11% lower at $9,447 under the NSA regime. The mean benefit level received by DSP recipients, if they gain employment, is $6,191 under the DSP regime, but three times as low at $2,168 under the NSA regime.
DSP recipients in public housing have higher RRs than DSP recipients in other tenures.
Hence, public renters experience the lowest returns to employment of all DSP recipients. This is mainly attributed to the withdrawal of housing subsidy that accompanies any gain in employment (Dalton & Ong 2005) . The simulation indicates that the proportion of public renters experiencing a RR greater than 75% will increase from 21% to 65%, indicating a tripling in the proportion of public renters whose income while not employed is over three-quarters of the income they can expect to receive on gaining employment 11 .
While unwaged owner purchasers have relatively high RRs, this is largely because of their partners' income, which cushion their decline in economic well-being while they remain unwaged. Over three-quarters of unwaged purchasers are partnered and among these, 34% have employed partners. In contrast, under one-quarter of public renters in our sample have partners and among these only 6% have employed partners. Further, the data show, but not presented in this article, that females typically have a higher RR than males under both the DSP and NSA because they attract a lower wage than males if they were to gain employment.
Lastly, the RR estimates suggest that this new policy will run counter to another government policy objective, which aims to increase public renters' employment participation. The CSHA requires SHAs 'to ensure that housing assistance supports access to employment and promotes social and labour market participation' (Commonwealth of Australia 2003) . This SHA responsibility is likely to become more onerous.
Individuals, housing affordability and work disincentives
Finally, we illustrate the effect of Welfare to Work for two real-life cases to illustrate what the policy change means to individuals from interview data obtained from two current DSP recipients, a private renter and a public renter. As indicated by our empirical analysis, private renters face substantial housing affordability problems while public renters suffer from high work disincentives, which are likely to be exacerbated by the policy change. We assumed that they were applying for DSP post-July 2006 and were judged capable of working at least 15 hours per week. The model was used to calculate their housing affordability levels and RRs under the two regimes:
 Case 1 is a single male private renter, economically inactive since the late 1990s, pays $140 rent per week and receives CRA;
 Case 2 is a partnered male public renter, economically inactive since 2002. His partner is working part-time and receiving NSA at a reduced rate.
Case 1, under the DSP regime, has a NAR of 44%. Being in the lowest 40% of the income distribution he is in housing stress. As expected, housing affordability for Case 1 declines when moved to the NSA regime, indicated by a NAR increase to 51%. Under the NSA regime, half of Case 1's income would be spent on housing costs, leaving little income for other necessities, including additional medical costs that disabled often have to meet. For Case 2 the NAR stays the same at 14% because rent is set at 25% of income.
However, Case 2 has higher work disincentives than Case 1 because of a rapid withdrawal of rent subsidy as income increases. The RRs indicates that Case 1's RR increases from 60% to 67% when moved from DSP to NSA. Case 2's RR increases from 71% to 80%. Under NSA, Case 2's income when unwaged is fourth-fifth of expected income when employed. After taking into account work-related expenditures such as transport costs that are not reflected in the RR, Case 2 will find returns to work to be extremely low.
Conclusion
This paper has presented an analysis of the connection between housing and the DSP. Its starting point was the observation that the Welfare to Work policy regime which will result in DSP applicants being redirected onto NSA, with accompanying economic requirements, does not take account of the housing circumstances of these future DSP applicants. In this context two questions were posed. proposed changes will have the greatest impact on renters, both private and public. First, private renters applying for DSP and diverted onto NSA will have less income and experience a decline in housing affordability. CRA is ineffective in mitigating the affordability decline, as the level of CRA payment is dependent on the market rent paid and not on income level. Second, while public renters currently have the impact of the change moderated because of income-related rents, increased rationing of public housing stock will force many future public housing eligible persons to rely on the private rental market for housing, putting them at risk of substantial affordability problems. Third, an unintended consequence of the policy change will be a reduction in SHA revenue that will exacerbate existing structural deficits. Fourth, the NSA regime will lower the financial return to work for future DSP applicants in all tenures, evident in the increase in RR for income units in each tenure. Public renters who are DSP recipients currently experience the lowest financial return to work and this will be exacerbated under the new system.
Currently there appears to be a trade-off between housing affordability and financial returns to work for renters. While public renters usually do not have housing affordability problems they face high work disincentives. While private renters' RRs are low relative to public renters, they suffer from severe housing affordability problems. Welfare to Work will intensify affordability problems and reduce financial returns to work. Private and public renters are especially vulnerable groups in the context of Welfare to Work.
The Australian experience can be used to sound a cautionary note to policy makers in other OECD countries seeking to constrain disability payments and increase labour market participation. It is important to consider the way in which housing interacts with income support systems, tax and labour market income if national goals are to extend beyond economic goals and include fairness.
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